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In years to come, world financial markets
will recall December 20, 1994, the day Mexico
devalued its currency, as a landmark date in
financial history. The devaluation inadvertently
initiated what Michel Camdessus, managing
director of the International Monetary Fund, aptly
dubbed “the first financial crisis of the twenty-
first century.” Most analysts and economic advi-
sors were surprised by not only the devaluation,
but also the speed with which its effects spilled
into other emerging economies. These effects
took the form of swift and massive capital out-
flows, as investors withdrew savings from those
countries in fear that they would devalue their
currencies as well.
The  tequila effect, as the Mexican crisis
has come to be known in Latin America, has
eroded the living standards of millions of people
throughout the region.1 Also affected, although
to a lesser extent, are the countries and interna-
tional organizations that quickly assisted Mexico
with an unusual financial package. The damag-
ing effects, actual or potential, of the Mexican
crisis on so many people’s welfare have caused
the public, investors, and the press to question
how Mexico’s crisis happened, how it influ-
enced other economies, and how to prevent
a similar crisis in the future. The response of
some analysts has been that the Mexican crisis
and its daunting spillover effects would have
been avoided had Mexico had a currency board-
like system similar to the one Argentina adopted
in 1991.
My goal in this article is to examine the
currency board proposition in light of current
economic theory and the experiences of Argen-
tina and Mexico. In the first part of the article,
I describe the monetary policies of those two
countries and argue that Mexico was forced to
devalue its currency while Argentina was not
because Mexico managed its monetary policy
with much more discretion than did Argentina,
which managed monetary policy according to
strict rules.
The seemingly obvious conclusion of the
first part of the article is that all it takes to
prevent exchange rate crises such as Mexico’s is
to guarantee that rules will take precedence
over discretion. Currency boards, their advo-
cates maintain, provide governments with the
adequate “technology” with which to handle
such a simple job.
In the second part of this article, however,
I argue that this optimistic view is too naive
because it overlooks the problem of time in-
consistency,2 a bit of economics jargon for
policymakers’ tendency to find good reasons to
Far more important than what
governments say—or even enact
into law—seems to be what govern-
ments do: actions speak louder than
words or laws. A country’s care for
its reputation plays a far more
important role than formal institu-
tions in solving the time inconsistency
problem and in providing govern-
ments with the incentives to adhere to
 policy rules despite the short-term
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repudiate plans they had promised not to aban-
don and policy rules they had vowed not to
break. Governments always justify those incon-
sistencies with the same basic excuse: the aban-
doned policy rule was the best course in the
conditions prevailing in the past but not for
present circumstances.3
Currency boards are a monetary policy
rule. As such they fail to resolve the time in-
consistency problem because, despite claims to
the contrary, currency boards cannot provide
a quick and painless fix to the economic woes
of countries that, like Mexico and Argentina,
have long histories inconsistent with low-
inflation targets. Quite to the contrary, imple-
mentation of rules in such countries is bound
to be costly because the credibility of each
country’s economic policies depends more on
the country’s track record in honoring past
commitments than on present institutional
arrangements.
In fact, as I argue in the third part of this
article, reputation is an important determinant of
which rules are best for a country. In general,
contingent policy rules or rules with (implicit or
explicit) escape clauses are superior to non-
contingent rules such as currency boards. But
the recent experiences of Argentina and Mexico
may suggest that implementation of the more
flexible contingent rules is particularly difficult
in countries that have inappropriately used in
the past built-in escape clauses. By virtue of
their poor track records, such countries may be
limited to the use of noncontingent rules. Cur-
rency boards are one such rule, but certainly not
the only one, and policymakers should carefully
evaluate the merits and shortcomings of cur-
rency boards relative to other types of ironclad
rules before recommending currency boards as
the best rule for a country.
Whatever rule is chosen, countries that
have lacked monetary discipline in the past and
attempt to implement strict monetary policies
eventually may suffer severe economic hard-
ships. When problems arise, ironclad rules such
as currency boards will be particularly suscep-
tible to the time inconsistency problem. Coun-
tries will be able to overcome such problems
only if their people are convinced that the con-
crete costs of sticking to the policy rule today
will be outweighed by the potential gains that
will accrue when investors’ confidence is even-
tually regained. Unfortunately, this cost–benefit
analysis is subject to considerably more dispute
than currency board advocates sometimes rec-
ognize. Nonetheless, this article concludes on
the optimistic note that Argentina’s and Mexico’s
recent experiences may provide useful empirical
evidence to validate or refute claims about cur-
rency boards, principles of time inconsistency
literature, and theories about the superiority of
rules over discretion.
The monetary policies of Argentina
and Mexico
Currency boards: A devaluation-proof rule
for money base creation. A currency board is a
policy rule for monetary base creation that
guarantees that a country will not devalue under
any circumstance while following that rule.4
Under a currency board, monetary policy is run
according to a very simple rule: the monetary
authority issues money only against a desig-
nated reserve currency, such as the U.S. dollar
or German mark, at a fixed exchange rate. This
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where  x is the level of monetary base that
satisfies the equality. In a country that runs its
monetary policy according to a currency board
rule, all policymakers need to do is print the
amount of money that satisfies x in equation 1.
This rule implies that if the stock of reserve
currency expands by 10 percent (say, due to a
capital inflow), then the monetary authority must
expand the monetary base by 10 percent. If, in
contrast, the stock of reserve currency shrinks
by 10 percent (say, due to a capital outflow),
then the monetary authority must contract the
monetary base by 10 percent. In other words, a
currency board mechanism for expanding and
contracting the monetary base ensures that the
proportion of monetary base to reserves remains




(2) MB$FR = _______________________
Stock of Reserve Currency.
The left-hand term in this equation is the
MB$FR ratio. A currency board simply instructs
the monetary authorities to set that ratio equal to
1, so that
(3) MB$FR = 1
becomes the currency board rule. The economic
interpretation of this rule is that the monetary16
base is fully backed by the designated foreign
reserve currency.
To understand how a currency board works,
suppose that for some reason all the households
in a country suddenly decide to exchange all the
money they have in their country’s currency for
dollars. Under a currency board system, this
massive speculative attack against the local cur-
rency will not trigger a devaluation, as it did in
Mexico, because a monetary authority adhering
to a currency board rule never runs out of the
reserve currency and can eventually buy back
all the monetary base (that is, exchange it for
foreign currency) with its reserves at the prom-
ised exchange rate.
Unfortunately, currency board advocates
often fail to emphasize that the cost of success-
fully defending the parity between the reserve
and domestic currencies may be a severe finan-
cial crisis. Lessons about the virtues and short-
comings of a currency board, as well as the
events that led to Mexico’s peso devaluation,
can be drawn from a review of the recent eco-
nomic experience of Argentina, a country that
has been following a quasi-currency board rule
very closely since 1991.
Argentina’s monetary policy and currency
boards. On April 1, 1991, Argentina’s congress
approved a convertibility law.5 This law obli-
gates the central bank to issue domestic cur-
rency (the peso) almost exclusively against the
dollar value of foreign reserves at the fixed
exchange rate of 1:1—in other words, at the rate
of 1 peso for every $1 received by the central
bank. This standard is the basic rule for money
creation described in the previous section. Al-
though many policy analysts refer to Argentina’s
current monetary regime as a currency board,
the policy has not been run as an orthodox
currency board rule. Even so, the policy so
closely resembles a pure currency board regime
that it serves as a useful example.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the mon-
etary base and foreign reserves in Argentina
during 1995. On January 1, 1995, the foreign
reserves were $15.7 billion, backing a monetary
base of 16.3 billion pesos. The MB$FR ratio was
very close to 1, the ratio stipulated by the cur-
rency board rule, so there was practically no
difference between a currency board and
Argentina’s monetary regime on January 1.
If Argentina’s policy were a textbook cur-
rency board, the two lines in Figure 1 would
overlap throughout the figure. The lines do not
overlap because, unlike an orthodox currency
board, Argentina’s convertibility law gives the
central bank some flexibility to act as lender of
last resort (Zarazaga 1995b). Argentina’s central
bank can issue money for that purpose up to the
level that would push the MB$FR ratio above
1.25. Stated differently, the convertibility law
does not require 100-percent backing of the
monetary base: only 80 percent of it must be
backed by foreign reserves (at the committed
1:1 exchange rate).
Had Argentina’s policy been a pure cur-
rency board, when the country’s foreign re-
serves shrank to about $10 billion in late March
1995, the monetary base would have shrunk
by 5.7 billion to 10.6 billion pesos. However,
Argentina’s monetary base declined only to
about 12.3 billion pesos. The MB$FR ratio peaked
at 1.23 on March 30, 1995.6 At that time,
Argentina’s central bank had $1 for every 1.23
pesos of bills and coins in the public’s wallets
and banks’ vaults (or, equivalently, $0.82 for
each peso of monetary base). Had the holders
of pesos wished to exchange all their cash—
the 12.3 billion pesos—for dollars, Argentina
would have been forced to devalue its currency
by about 23 percent.
Of course, this scenario overstates the risks
of a devaluation in Argentina in March 1995
because it would be rare for all individuals and
businesses simultaneously to want to rid them-
selves of the local currency. Some amount, even
if modest, of bills and coins will always be
needed to carry out transactions such as paying
taxes or buying a soda in vending machines.
Because some local currency will never be pre-
sented in exchange for dollars, the monetary
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The monetary authority can exploit this
fact to manage the monetary base and expand it
in moderate amounts, as Argentina’s monetary
authorities did, to act as lender of last resort.
Although such a moderate expansion to help
the financial system will not be backed by for-
eign reserves, the risk of a devaluation will be
reasonable if policymakers do not abuse their
leeway. Argentina’s 80-percent coverage of the
monetary base with foreign reserves, for in-
stance, seems prudent.7
To summarize, Argentina’s quasi-currency
board rule has allowed its monetary authorities
a little more flexibility in conducting monetary
policy than an orthodox currency board would
have. Still, Argentina’s system imposes very clear
limits on discretionary expansions of the mon-
etary base. Monetary authorities respecting simi-
lar limits to their discretion within a fixed
exchange rate regime will not be able to isolate
changes in foreign reserves from changes in the
monetary base for too long. Sooner or later,
sustained declines in foreign reserves will be
reflected in corresponding declines in the mone-
tary base. This is why in Figure 1 the monetary
base and foreign reserves in Argentina move in
tandem, despite the flexibility built into the
country’s quasi-currency board regime.
Argentina’s quasi-currency board rule under
attack. When Argentina’s peso came under
speculative attack in first-quarter 1995, policy-
makers could defend the currency because they
stubbornly adhered to a policy rule that guaran-
teed that at least 80 percent of the monetary
base would always be covered by foreign re-
serves. But the price of this success was one of
the most severe banking panics in modern
Argentine history.
The performance of Argentina’s quasi-
currency board during a financial crisis illus-
trates that currency boards can avert devalua-
tions. But because of their very limited ability to
act as a lender of last resort, they introduce the
risk that a minor, Orange County-type liquidity
crisis8 will become a devastating national finan-
cial panic almost overnight.
Argentina’s case study demonstrates that
currency boards have very little power to con-
trol financial crises when they occur in a
modern, independent country, rather than in
the colonies frequently cited as success stories
in the literature of currency board advocates.9
Argentina’s financial panic started with a
liquidity squeeze in Bank Extrader, a small
bank that held barely 0.2 percent of the total
deposits in Argentina’s financial system. Extrader
was heavily exposed in Mexican bonds and
securities. When the value of those assets fell
dramatically in the aftermath of the devaluation
of the Mexican peso on December 20, 1994, the
bank could no longer cover its short-term lia-
bilities, particularly some time deposits that
came due. This shortage triggered a run against
the bank. Extrader, unable to honor its deposits,
was foreclosed on by the central bank on Janu-
ary 18, 1995.
The fear that other banks were similarly
exposed translated into a generalized banking
panic. Suddenly, Argentina’s financial system was
awash in the same indiscriminate chain reaction
that had transmitted the tequila effect through-
out Latin American capital markets. Almost im-
mediately, the run against the banks became a
run against the domestic currency. People feared
that Argentina would devalue as Mexico had
done shortly before. As depicted by the decline
in foreign reserves in Figure 1, much of the cash
withdrawn from Argentina’s financial system went
to purchase dollars that were sent abroad.
By the end of April 1995, Argentina’s fi-
nancial system had lost 18 percent of the depos-
its it had before the Mexican peso devaluation.
As a measure of the severity of this contraction,
Argentina experienced in just three months the
same proportional contraction in deposits as the
United States did during the first two years of the
Great Depression. In the wake of Argentina’s
financial panic, many banks were forced to sus-
pend the payment of deposits. Many investors—
foreign and domestic alike—have yet to recover
their savings. Argentina’s experience, therefore,
should dispel the notion that a currency board
would have prevented the financial meltdown
Mexico would have suffered without the U.S.–
International Monetary Fund aid package.
The complete interruption of the chain of
payments and shutdown of credit markets took
its toll on Argentina’s real economy. Second-
quarter gross domestic product (GDP) in 1995
fell by about 5 percent from its second-quarter
1994 level, while the fall in third-quarter 1995
from third-quarter 1994 was 8 percent. These
figures have led many private forecasters to
conclude that Argentina’s 1995 GDP (adjusted
for inflation) will be 2.5 percent below that of
1994. Perhaps the most worrisome consequence
of the financial crisis was a jump in the country’s
unemployment rate, from 12.5 percent in Octo-
ber 1994 to an all-time high of 18.6 percent in
May 1995.
Numbers like Argentina’s make it easy to
understand why investors may fear countries
will abandon currency board-like rules. When
countries confront banking crises, such rules18
provide little more than homeopathic therapy
while panics run their natural course.10 As time
inconsistency theory predicts, during times of
stress, investors grow skeptical about govern-
ments’ pledges to honor their commitments to
currency board-like rules. Investors conjecture
that rising unemployment and eroding political
support might force governments to abandon
the rule-bound currency board system and re-
place it with policies prone to devaluation—
what the currency board was designed to
prevent.11 That time inconsistency problem is
why investors questioned the continuity of
Argentina’s quasi-currency board rule and why
they withdrew their savings from the country.
This capital flight, in fact, helped generate the
financial crisis that continued the cycle of de-
valuation fears.
Contrary to the predictions of currency
board advocates, the formal legal arrangement
of a quasi-currency board did not protect Argen-
tina from a speculative attack against its cur-
rency. Argentina’s monetary policy, as predicted,
prevented a devaluation, but the price was a
banking crisis far more severe than currency
board advocates had anticipated.
Mexico’s discretionary monetary policy. The
movement of Argentina’s monetary base and
foreign reserves displayed in Figure 1 contrasts
sharply with that of Mexico’s. Figure 2 shows
that Mexico’s monetary base remained fairly con-
stant and even increased after October 1994,
despite a continuous decline in foreign reserves.
The difference between the two figures suggests
that Argentina was more conservative than
Mexico in tolerating deviations from the cur-
rency board rule. The MB$FR ratio never reached
the legal limit of 1.25 in Argentina but was 1.62
in Mexico on December 19, 1994, the day before
the devaluation.12 Undoubtedly, a devaluation is
much more likely in a country that backs less
than 80 percent of its monetary base with for-
eign reserves (as Mexico did in late 1994) than
in a country that backs 80 percent or more of its
monetary base with foreign reserves (as has
been the case in Argentina).
Interestingly enough, until October 1994,
Mexico had managed its monetary base accord-
ing to a rule that far exceeded the rigor of the
currency board standard. Before fourth-quarter
1994, Mexico’s MB$FR ratio had been below 1
(that is, Mexico’s foreign reserves had exceeded
its monetary base). This observation suggests an
alternative interpretation of Mexico’s monetary
policy. Perhaps what differentiated Mexico’s ex-
perience from Argentina’s is not that Argentina
passed a law requiring a quasi-currency board
rule while Mexico did not but, rather, that some-
time after October 1994 Mexico decided to repu-
diate its policy suddenly and almost without
warning.13
In any case, Mexico’s relatively high fourth-
quarter 1994 MB$FR ratio implies that Banco de
México was no longer in a position to exchange
Mexico’s entire monetary base for dollars at the
promised exchange rate, and that, subject to a
speculative attack, Mexico would eventually be
forced to devalue its currency by about 60 per-
cent.14 Unfortunately, the fear of a speculative
attack became self-fulfilling and triggered a chain
of events that led to the December 20, 1994,
devaluation.
But why did the Mexican monetary authori-
ties allow the monetary base to grow without
the backing of foreign reserves after October
1994? As Mexican monetary authorities later ex-
plained, a continuous drain of foreign reserves
had started in February 199415 and had exposed
the banking sector to the risk of a liquidity
crunch. Concerned abut a banking crisis, Mexi-
can monetary authorities tried to preempt a
financial panic by acting as a lender of last
resort. Discount window loans to allegedly
troubled financial institutions expanded the
monetary base beyond the level of foreign re-
serves (Zarazaga 1995b), leaving Mexico vulner-
able to speculative attack and devaluation.
On face value, the expansion of Mexico’s
monetary base through its central bank’s
discount window—despite declining foreign
reserves—may appear inconsistent with the
pegged exchange rate regime in place at the
time. The action, however, was not necessarily
Figure 2
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inconsistent, provided the monetary authorities
had reasons to believe that the capital outflows
and consequent loss of foreign reserves were
only temporary and would reverse themselves
once the fears of political turmoil subsided,16
and that the minimum demand for local cur-
rency had increased as well.
Banco de México authorities have stated
that such reasons did indeed exist,17 even if
now, in hindsight, it may appear that the effects
of political uncertainty on Mexico’s credit-
worthiness were underestimated18 and the in-
crease in demand for Mexican pesos was
overestimated.19
Undoubtedly, something went wrong.
Mexico most likely suffered the same problem
that has hit many other countries when their
currencies have been devalued after their
policymakers miscalculated the leeway they
had for expansions of the money base not
backed by foreign reserves. In the attempt to
fine-tune the economy, even the most skilled
policymakers may read the tea leaves incorrectly
from time to time. In Mexico’s case, the mone-
tary authorities validated the use of the dis-
count window—and, therefore, the increase of
the unbacked monetary supply—to a level
that, ex post, exceeded what the market was
willing to absorb.20
If the source of the problem is not neces-
sarily unskilled policymakers but the discre-
tion they enjoy in conducting monetary policy
(for example, to preempt bank runs), then the
obvious fix would be to take away policy-
makers’ discretion. This is the reasoning behind
many enthusiastic recommendations in favor




Since a currency board is nothing but a
rule for money creation, the debate about the
advantages, disadvantages, and desirability of
currency boards amounts to another rendition
of the long-standing rules-versus-discretion
debate. Currency board advocates maintain that
the Mexican crisis would have been avoided if a
currency board like Argentina’s had limited the
discretion of Mexico’s monetary authorities. Al-
though this argument might ring true, it naively
attributes to formal rules and institutions more
power than they have in committing govern-
ments to keep their promises in the face of
adverse economic conditions.
The problem is that policy rules, however
institutionalized, are inherently time inconsis-
tent—in other words, governments will tend to
abandon them. Advocates of currency boards
have failed to show how such institutions can
overcome this problem. As mentioned earlier,
Argentina, despite its quasi-currency board, suf-
fered a speculative attack driven by distrust in
the continuity of its monetary policy.
Argentina’s example further indicates that
legal institutions per se provide very little re-
assurance about a country’s future economic
policies. In fact, during Argentina’s financial cri-
sis, Art. 17 of that country’s central bank charter
was modified by presidential decree to give
that institution more flexibility in its discount
window policies. That charter, approved by law
number 24,144 of September 23, 1992, had en-
acted the central bank independence. But the
presidential decree raised and justified the fears
that the whole central bank charter and, there-
fore, central bank independence, would be re-
pudiated. Another indication of how ineffective
formal institutions and legal arrangements are
in limiting policymakers’ discretion comes
from German history. The Reichsbank, the cen-
tral bank of the German Empire, was declared
legally independent on May 26, 1922, just three
months before the onset of the 1922–23 German
hyperinflation.21
Besides, neither Germany nor the United
States has an explicit or legislated rule for run-
ning monetary policy such as Argentina’s, yet
Germany’s or the United States’ credibility in
keeping inflation low and its currency stable far
exceeds Argentina’s because Germany and the
United States have strong track records.
Far more important than what governments
say—or even enact into law—seems to be what
governments do: actions speak louder than words
or laws. A country’s care for its reputation plays
a far more important role than its institutions in
solving the time inconsistency problem and in
providing governments with the incentives to
adhere to policy rules despite the short-term
temptation to do otherwise. This is the basic
insight of Barro and Gordon (1983) and the
literature that followed.22 The credibility of
policymakers and economic policies will be much
higher in countries with a long tradition of re-
specting policy rules than in countries with a
tradition of repudiating them.23
Given the role of reputation, new policy
rules will meet considerable skepticism in coun-
tries that have failed to demonstrate past disci-
pline. Guided by a country’s history of repeatedly
broken commitments, economic agents will (jus-
tifiably) bet against policy continuity, whether
the government promises come in the form of20
public statements or formal institutions such as
currency boards.24
Formal institutions or laws cannot remove
skepticism about governments’ ability to carry
out commitments in countries that have re-
peatedly failed to honor past promises. The
adoption of rules in such countries, however
implemented, sooner or later is likely to pro-
duce severe economic and social hardships while
the country persuades investors that it has
mended its ways and will no longer abandon its
commitments.
Are currency boards the best rule?
The failure to explain how currency boards
solve the time inconsistency problem is not the
only wrinkle in arguments that portray currency
boards as the instant recipe for restored credi-
bility and prosperity. But setting aside the issue
of time inconsistency, there is the normative
question of which is the best rule. What the
literature has established is that optimal rules
are superior to discretion.25 A vast array of plausi-
ble policy rules and, in particular, of monetary
policy rules is available to policymakers, and
economists have yet to reach a consensus that
currency board rules are superior to any other
feasible rule.
Furthermore, many economists would
argue that contingent rules are superior to iron-
clad ones that are invariant to changing eco-
nomic contingencies. Several studies, in fact,
show that rules with escape clauses are the best
course of action.26
In this spirit, Bordo and Kydland (1995)
argue that, despite appearing to be an ironclad
rule, the gold standard in reality had implicit
escape clauses. Bordo and Kydland point to
periods when England, the country that most
consistently adhered to the rule, temporarily
suspended convertibility of the pound into gold
(at a fixed exchange rate of £3.85 per ounce)
during wars and financial crises.27
Admittedly, the use of rules with escape
clauses opens a Pandora’s box because rules
with too many contingencies and escape clauses
can become indistinguishable from discretion.28
For example, did Mexico repudiate the fixed
exchange rate rule through its extensive lender-
of-last-resort activity just before the devaluation?
Or, was Mexico simply exercising an escape
clause to avert a financial crisis in the face of
adverse and unforeseen political shocks, as
England did to quench the incipient banking
panics of 1847, 1857, and 1866? This will be the
subject of considerable debate for many years
to come, in part because several empirical
and theoretical issues involved remain largely
unresolved.29
But events in Mexico suggest that financial
markets participants did not view the monetary
policy actions at the end of 1994 as a temporary
and justifiable use of an escape clause. Rather,
the markets seem to have confused those poli-
cies with superficially similar ones that several
years earlier (in 1982 and 1987) had led to
devaluations accompanied or immediately fol-
lowed by violations of elementary free market
rules, such as nationalization of banks, confisca-
tion of deposits, open or disguised forms of
price and capital controls, and outright default
on government debt. As in the tale of the boy
who falsely cried wolf too often, Mexican
policymakers in 1994 were trapped by the bad
reputation of their predecessors.30
Perhaps one of the more important lessons
of the Mexican crisis of 1994–95 is that the
invocation of escape clauses might be unwise in
countries that, in the eyes of investors, have
abused such outs in the past.31 For these coun-
tries, ironclad rules might well be the only hope
to restore investors’ confidence and, therefore,
future prosperity. But this essentially sound point
will be perhaps better served by the recogni-
tion that a currency board is just one type of
ironclad rule, not necessarily, and certainly not
in general, the best one.
Whichever ironclad rule proves best, it is
necessary to revisit the issue of how it will
overcome the time inconsistency problem.
More concretely, will societies accept the im-
mediate costs of implementing a rule, particu-
larly severe in countries with a poor reputation,
on the promise of the benefits that will accrue
in time?
Minimizing or dismissing the costs of a
particular ironclad rule in the zeal of promoting
its adoption (as has often been done) could
prove self-defeating because a society may too
easily become disenchanted and abandon the
rule at the first setback, before the rule has had
time to take hold and produce the desired re-
sults. To the contrary, the cause of rules would
be better served if scholars, decisionmakers, and
opinionmakers clearly explained to societies
the nature of the inevitable economic hardships
the rules will entail after years of inconsistent
monetary policy.
In this sense, Argentina’s decision to re-
spect the quasi-currency board rule despite its
serious financial crisis is almost unprece-
dented. Perhaps Argentina’s authorities (and
Argentina’s people, who reelected the govern-
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to stick to their guns by a conviction that the
alternative, to abandon the currency board, would
have been perceived, as in Mexico, not as the
use of an escape clause to control a banking
panic but as a return to the old ways of running
monetary policy. Such past policies were based
on almost unbounded discretion and led to
decades of impoverishing inflationary stagna-
tion and to a traumatic hyperinflation during
1989–90.32
In any case, much of the difficulty policy-
makers face in choosing among different policy
rules arises because the theory of costs and
benefits of alternative policies is still well ahead
of the empirical evidence available to measure
them. For all their catastrophic dimensions, one
potentially positive outcome of recent events in
Mexico and Argentina might be to help close the
theory–evidence gap. After all, those experi-
ences are as close as economists get to con-
trolled experiments needed to measure the costs
and benefits of alternative policies: both are
Latin American countries with similar character-
istics and past histories, and each responded
with a different policy to basically the same
speculative attack against its currency. Of course,
the task of identifying the effects of the different
policies followed by those countries so far will
not be as easy as the highly stylized, stark
identifying assumptions just mentioned might
suggest.
There are a number of other important
factors that now or in the future could affect the
economic outcomes of those two countries. But
in economics, as in any other social science, the
only feasible experiment is complex, sometimes
fuzzy historical evidence, and few economists
would argue that we have not learned anything
from examining the past. Just the opposite is
true, as few economists can resist the tempta-
tion of presenting data, which is information
from the past, to back up their arguments and
theories. It does not seem preposterous, there-
fore, to think that clever economists will be able
to design appropriate quantitative methods to
identify and measure cause–effect relationships
between the eventually different economic per-
formances and the so far certainly different policy
responses of Argentina and Mexico. For that
reason, the recent experiences of those two
countries are already proving to be a popular
and fertile area of research, one that might
help assess the wisdom of Argentina’s decision
to stick to its quasi-currency board arrange-
ment and, in any event, enrich and change the
terms of the rules-versus-discretion debate for
years to come.
Conclusions
This analysis of the monetary policies of
Argentina and Mexico has shown that, unlike
Mexico, Argentina prevented a devaluation of its
currency by following a quasi-currency board
rule. Based on this observation, many have rec-
ommended a currency board for Mexico as well.
This recommendation, however, is based on
the naive belief that the formal institution of a
currency board provides a commitment tech-
nology that ensures policymakers will conduct
monetary policy according to a very well-
defined rule.
The truth is that currency boards and simi-
lar institutions cannot enforce a government’s
everlasting commitment to low inflation and
pegged or fixed exchange rate policies any
more than a wedding ring can ensure a spouse’s
commitment to an everlasting marriage. This
weakness is common to other institutions and
written laws as well, and its source is the same:
ironclad rules do not resolve the basic problem
of time inconsistency. This problem lies at the
heart of the lack of credibility that haunts
policymakers in countries that have frequently
broken their commitments in the past. This
lack of credibility explains why currency boards
are subject to speculative attacks that they can
resist without devaluing only at the cost of
very severe financial crises.
Therefore, depictions of currency boards—
or any other ironclad rule, for that matter—as
powerful devices that will magically restore in-
vestors’ confidence and, therefore, prosperity
almost overnight and without pain do not help.
On the contrary, this optimistic assessment may
have the perverse effect of providing policy-
makers with the incentive to abandon their com-
mitments on the mistaken impression that later,
simply by institutionalizing a rule such as a
currency board, they can quickly and painlessly
restore lost credibility.
In truth, a government’s credibility is like
crystal: once broken, it is very difficult and
costly to restore. Rules would, perhaps, stand a
better chance of overcoming the time inconsis-
tency problem if the governments and societies
of countries that abandoned past promises un-
derstood the true cost of regaining credibility.
The costs of following a sensible monetary rule
are the price to pay for the bad reputation that
stems from a past of broken trust and for the
future economic development that regaining cred-
ibility will eventually bring about.
Unfortunately, economic theory has made
little progress in predicting when and why
countries will finally abandon discretionary22
policies and switch to rules, or, equivalently,
when countries will perceive that future benefits
of restored investor confidence outweigh the
present economic hardships of rebuilding repu-
tations.
In any case, societies considering commit-
ment to a rule should consider that noncontin-
gent policy rules such as currency boards are, in
general, inferior to contingent rules. But be-
cause the distinction between pure discretion
and contingent rules may become blurred in
countries that have abused the flexibility pro-
vided by rules with escape clauses, such coun-
tries may have pushed themselves into an all or
nothing situation. Ironclad rules may be the only
rules previously deceived investors and financial
markets participants will interpret as rules in
such countries. But this is only conjecture that
so far, to our knowledge, has not been formally
proved. In this sense, the debate surrounding
the convenience and effectiveness of currency
boards is perhaps a red herring that distracts
from the real issues, which are how to deter-
mine the best policy rule for countries that have
frequently reneged on commitments and how to
protect those rules from the continuous assault
of the time inconsistency forces. Economists and
policymakers still have a lot of thinking to do on
both counts, especially after the recent eco-
nomic experiences of Argentina and Mexico.
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All remaining errors are mine.
1 For a more detailed discussion of the tequila effect,
see Zarazaga (1995a).
2 Unfortunately, with the notable exception of Schwartz
(1993), this insight has been lost in the currency
boards literature.
3 Although economists and social scientists have long
been aware of this problem, (see, for example, Simons
1936), it was not until 1977 that it was formalized and
brought to the forefront of the theory of economic
policy by Kydland and Prescott (1977). For an excel-
lent summary, see Taylor (1985).
4 This article assumes the reader is familiar with the
definition of the main monetary aggregates and, in
particular, with the difference between primary expan-
sion and secondary expansion of the money supply.
See Zarazaga (1995a) for a brief and pedagogical
exposition of these issues. For a more rigorous treat-
ment, see Hanke and Schuler (1994) and Humpage
and McIntire (1995).
5 Law number 23,928.
6 The stock of foreign reserves corresponds to the liquid
foreign reserves net of domestic government dollar-
denominated debt in the central bank’s portfolio.
7 The 2.3 billion pesos by which the monetary base
exceeded the stock of foreign reserves at the end of
March 1995 represented only about 1 percent of
Argentina’s GDP. It is unlikely that the demand for local
currency will ever fall below that proportion of GDP,
and, therefore, it was unlikely that in March 1995
Argentina’s central bank would have had to buy back
all the monetary base (12.3 billion pesos) with the $10
billion of reserves.
8 This reference is to the 1994 insolvency of a small
municipality in the United States that threatened to
send that country’s municipal bonds markets into a
tailspin because of fear that other municipalities would
default as well.
9 For example, Hanke and Schuler (1994, 86) assert that
“Failures by commercial banks have been minor in
[currency board] systems.” But the lessons that can
be extracted from the historical experiences they
reviewed are very limited because almost all such
experiences have taken place in British colonies
whose commercial banks were usually branches of
international financial institutions. Those financial
institutions had, as eloquently stated by Schwartz
(1993, 182–83), “the resources to support a troubled
local branch.…The London head offices of local
branches provided lender of last resort services, if
needed.” In contrast, foreign banks were among the
first to cut credit lines to their Argentine branches in
the aftermath of the devaluation of the Mexican peso.
10 It is important to emphasize that I do not claim that
currency boards create banking crises, but rather that
they have very limited ability to prevent them.
11 This perception would not be totally unjustified. After
all, as the next section explains, that is exactly what
happened in Mexico at the end of 1994.
12 According to Banco de México reports, on December
19, 1994, the stock of foreign reserves was $10.5
billion, while the monetary base was 59.6 billion new
pesos. The dollar value of this monetary base at the
exchange rate of 3.5 new pesos per dollar—that is, at
the approximate exchange rate promised on the eve of
the devaluation—implies a MB$FR ratio of 1.62.
13 MB$FR ratios of 1.62 on December 19, 1994, and 1.12
on November 30, 1994, suggest explosive behavior in
the intervening period. Indeed, in early December the
monetary base grew about 22 percent, while foreign
reserves fell around 16 percent. At least part of this
expansion, however, may have been justified in the
higher demand for currency typical of the month of
December, when consumers need unusual amounts
of cash to finance expenses related to Christmas.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 23 ECONOMIC REVIEW  FOURTH QUARTER 1995
14 In fact, the depreciation of the peso was in that order
of magnitude in the early phases of the floating
exchange regime adopted after December 22, 1994.
15 Although there is some debate about the underlying
consequences of those capital outflows, it is symptom-
atic that foreign reserves fell by 40 percent in the
twenty days immediately following a major political
disturbance: the assassination of presidential candi-
date Luis Donaldo Colosio in March 1994. In fact,
according to Calvo and Mendoza (1995), “Investors’
prospects on Mexico’s fundamentals suddenly
changed, in part because of the increasing complexity
of the ongoing political conflicts.” [Emphasis added.]
16 If Mexico’s policymakers were mistaken in this regard,
then they were in good company. As Calvo and
Mendoza (1995) write, “Most of the information avail-
able until the end of 1994, including the assessment of
international financial organizations, praised Mexico as
a country with full balance in monetary and fiscal
policies and set for strong future growth on the basis
of its far-reaching reforms—at about the same time the
crash occurred, Mexico was accepted as a member
of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development].” [Emphasis added.]
17 See, for example, Mancera (1995) for the Banco de
México president’s account.
18 The inability to roll over the tesobonos debt (very short-
term government debt adjusted according to the ex-
change rate) played a major role in the events that led
to the crisis of December 1994. Interested readers
can consult the study by Calvo and Mendoza (1995)
and Cole and Kehoe (1995).
19 Had Mexican monetary authorities had the recent
econometric model of Kamin and Rogers (1995) and
used it to predict the demand for currency, they would
have forecast money demand growth below what they
actually observed, especially for the first and third
quarters of 1994. Had lower forecasts been used as a
target in setting domestic credit (discount window)
policies, the supply of monetary base would have
grown at a slower rate than it actually did. Calvo and
Mendoza (1995) use this finding to argue that mone-
tary policy may have been too loose relative to the
fixed exchange rate target and may have helped create
the conditions for the speculative attack of late 1994.
20 One could blame the policymakers for having missed
several signs of the crisis to come. But many such
signals could have been dismissed ex ante on the
grounds that they reflected temporary factors contain-
ing very little information about more permanent eco-
nomic imbalances. The exception, perhaps, is the
money demand estimates mentioned in note 19. It is
even possible to argue, as I do later, that Mexico was
following a fixed exchange rate rule with an implicit
escape clause, and that its policymakers merely exer-
cised that escape clause in the face of extraordinary
political events.
21 Cottarelli (1993, Appendix II) points out that it is
possible to identify countries—Belgium or Japan, for
instance—whose central banks are not legally inde-
pendent yet act much more so than the central banks
of other countries that have theoretically independent
central banks with the authority of written law. Cottarelli
also discusses how the legal protection of the central
bank can be and has been circumvented in the latter
group of countries.
22 See especially Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari
and Kehoe (1990).
23 This might explain why Canada, Belgium, and Italy
have been able to sustain levels of government debt
that, as percentages of GDP, are several times higher
than the corresponding levels for Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico.
24 It seems implausible that Mexico could restore its
credibility with the simple announcement of a currency
board law similar to Argentina’s. Investors would
question whether Mexico would adhere to yet another
rule after abandoning its fixed exchange rate regime in
October 1994.
25 Examples of optimal rules are the Ramsey policies typi-
cally used as benchmarks of the analysis in the time
inconsistency literature (see, for example, Chari 1988).
26 Lucas and Stokey (1983), for example, construct
models in which the optimal (Ramsey) policy is to
abandon in the event of war the otherwise always
honored rule of repaying the government debt. As
Bordo and Kydland (1995) put it: “In an uncertain
world, the Ramsey plan generally would be a contin-
gent plan or rule. Strictly speaking, in a realistic
environment the Ramsey plan would include many
contingencies, some of which may make little differ-
ence to society’s welfare.”
27 Bordo and Kydland identify these periods of suspen-
sion as 1797–1821 and 1914–25, which roughly
correspond with the Napoleonic wars and World War I,
respectively, and 1847, 1857, and 1866, which corre-
spond to periods of banking panics.
28 Bordo and Kydland (1995) state the problem well:
“Drawbacks of including many contingencies, how-
ever, are lack of transparency and possible uncertainty
among the public regarding the will to obey the
original plan.”
29 Those who lean toward the second interpretation
may point out that the assassination of presidential
candidate Colosio qualified as a rare circumstance:
no former or current president or presidential candi-
date has been assassinated in Mexico in the past
fifty-six years.
30 Thus, investors seem to have reacted not so much to
fundamentals—that is, to economic policies—of the
present but to those of the past. The same seems to
be true about the causes of the bank panic that spread
the tequila effect to Argentina, since according to a
private report issued at the time, investors in that24
country withdrew their money from the financial
institutions on the concern that “the government might
freeze bank deposits in order to stem a withdrawal of
funds from the country” (according to a June 1, 1995,
Bloomberg wire report) as it had done in 1990. The
conjecture that Argentina’s and Mexico’s track records
were catalysts of their financial crises could be of
particular interest to scholars and policymakers be-
cause it suggests that reputation (and thus, past funda-
mentals) may play a major role in the genesis of herd
behaviors like the one to which many analysts have
attributed, at least in part, the speculative attacks
against the currencies of Mexico and Argentina.
31 This is an informal restatement of Chari’s (1988) advice
that “policy recommendations that ignore the effect of
history on people’s expectations will yield inferior
outcomes” made in his insightful review of the exten-
sions of the Barro–Gordon reputational framework to
the case of contingent rules.
32 Argentina’s people and policymakers also may have
been inspired by the example of their close neighbor,
Chile. That country’s rapid rate of growth over the past
twelve years (GDP per capita has grown at an annual
rate of almost 5 percent since 1983) is largely seen as
the reward for the very strict monetary policies with
which Chile responded in 1982 to a severe banking
crisis. That crisis resulted in a decline of 15 percent in
GDP and in unemployment rates in the same range as
those Argentina is experiencing now.
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